A LAND FOR ALL

FROM CONFLICT TO RECONCILIATION:
A new vision for Palestinian-Israeli peace
Draft for discussion
Both peoples have a profound connection to this land or parts of it, whether they call it Eretz Yisrael (Israel), or Palestine, and both consider it their homeland. Jewish-Israelis and Palestinians live side by side, sometimes intermingled, throughout this land.

Based on this reality we, a group of Jews and Palestinians, offer a vision for reconciliation. Our vision precludes supremacy by one nation over the other. Our vision is one of equal national and individual rights for everyone living in this homeland, a vision of true partnership between the peoples of this land. Partnership is the best guarantee for respecting and promoting the interests of members of both nations. It is a guarantee for enduring peace and for reconciliation.

There is a deep emotional need for partnership in this land. When Palestinians say Palestine, they refer to the entire area between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean; just as when Israelis say Eretz Yisrael, they refer to the same space. The homeland is one and the same, even if it is called by different names. No international borders could change these connections, this identity. No international borders could sever Palestinians’ ties to Jaffa, Haifa, or Lod any more than they could sever Jewish ties to Hebron, Nablus or Bethlehem.

We live in a small geographic space. If a river in the West Bank gets contaminated, the groundwater in the coastal plain is affected. If air quality is poor on the coastal plain, it will be felt in the West Bank. In the small space shared by these two peoples, everyone’s interests would be best served by a high level of cooperation.

More than a hundred years of conflict have taught us that no nation can be the sole lord of this land. Occupation, annexation and denial of rights do nothing but deepen the conflict and fan the flames of hatred, and the concept of separation has failed as it ignores the complex reality of two peoples living in the same land. Unilateral solutions have also failed time and time again.
We boldly say: Mutual recognition that this land is a shared homeland - a homeland for Jewish Israelis and for Palestinians – is a must. That is why the political solution must reflect this emotional reality and create a framework that allows members of both nations to travel and live throughout the shared homeland, without undermining their right to self-determination and their ability to exercise this right.

The solution we are proposing, which has been formulated and honed through in-depth discussions and hundreds of meetings between Palestinian and Israeli citizens and public figures, includes two sovereign states in Eretz Yisrael/Palestine, where both nations can fulfill their right to self-determination, but without strict physical and demographic separation. In other words: Political separation - yes. Geographic and demographic separation - no. Mutuality, partnership and equality - yes.

With these shared understandings, we propose a solution based on three tenets:

**Independence:** Israel and Palestine will be two independent, sovereign states with full control over their territory, with a border drawn according to the June 4, 1967 lines. Both states will be democracies, with regimes based on the rule of law, recognition for universal human rights as accepted in international law, equality, liberty, and respect for the rights of minorities and the sanctity of human life.

**Mutual respect and recognition:** Both states will recognize and respect the deep affiliation of both Palestinians and Jews to the land in its entirety. Both states will be committed to the vision of an open land, where citizens of both countries have the right to travel, work and live anywhere.

**Partnership between the states:** The two states will establish a shared superstructure of effective, joint institutions operating on the basis of equality and agreed upon by both states. These institutions will address security, civil and socio-economic rights, economic issues, environmental protection, climate change and more. This shared superstructure will allow the two states to work together in areas requiring collaboration and individually on matters they decide are better run independently.
Unlike separation or the one state solution, the shared framework we are proposing can resolve some of the key sticking points of the conflict, which are inadequately addressed by other solutions. We do not purport to provide answers to all these questions in the limited format of this brochure. We are well aware that much work still has to be done in order to present detailed plans and sophisticated systems to help visualize how such a partnership could come to life, how it might function and what it would take to transition both peoples out of the grim circumstances they are in now into a better future. To start moving, we must first point out the obstacles that stand in the way today. In the following pages we list seven of these obstacles and suggest how to overcome them:

1. OPEN BORDERS

Having recognized borders is a hallmark of sovereignty. This explains why so much effort has been put into outlining the borders of Israel and Palestine in discussions of a future two-state solution. After more than a hundred years of conflict and more than fifty years of occupation, it is essential to know where the sovereign territory of the State of Israel begins and where it ends, and the same for the sovereign territory of the State of Palestine.

Until now, discussions around borders have been based on two premises. One was the supposition that only full and clear separation between Israel and Palestine - “we are here and they are there” - could bring peace. The other, stemming from the fact that the evacuation of settlements is a politically charged issue for Israel, was the supposition that most of the settlements would remain within the Israeli state. Put together, these two premises led the way to the notion of a territorial exchange. Israel would annex “settlement blocs” and, in return, hand over parts of its sovereign territory to the Palestinian state.
The “territorial exchange” concept has two glaring flaws: For the Palestinian state to have territorial contiguity, Israel would still have to evacuate at least 100,000 settlers - a serious political obstacle. Secondly, it still leaves the question of the final border open, as it depends on the size of the “settlement blocs,” which incentivizes settlement expansion.

We are seeking a way out of this vicious cycle. Our premise is that the border between Israel and Palestine will be based on the June 4, 1967, border, not because it is somehow hallowed, but because there is solid agreement around this border, partly expressed in UN resolutions. This would not preclude parties to the negotiations from agreeing on changes to this border, if that is their wish. However, the border will not be determined by the size or location of “settlement blocs,” but by mutual agreement.

The borders between Israel and Palestine will not vanish. Each state will have full sovereignty in its territory. The borders will, however, be open to citizens of both independent states, which will have established a solid partnership. With borders delineating political separation between the two states, but not demographic or geographic separation, their ultimate placement will lose its critical importance, and the question of borders will no longer be the sticking point it is today.

2. PALESTINIAN REFUGEES RETURN TO THE HOMELAND

In the fighting that took place in Eretz Yisrael / Palestine from 1947 to 1949, about 750,000 Palestinians were uprooted from their homes, denied re-entry into Israel and became refugees.

Tens of thousands more Palestinians were internally displaced within Israel. Resolution No. 194 of the UN General Assembly stipulates Palestinian refugees should be allowed to return to their homeland “at the earliest practicable date,” so long as they “live at peace with their neighbors.”
Seventy years have gone by. Today, half the Palestinian people live in the diaspora, outside their homeland. The desire and the demand to return to the homeland is felt in almost every Palestinian family, wherever it currently resides. It has also occupied a central role in the Palestinian national narrative in the past seventy years.

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict was not born in 1967. Its roots go back to 1948, and even earlier. To advance towards settling the conflict, these roots must be addressed, even if doing so is difficult and painful. Therefore, the resolution to the conflict cannot ignore or evade the “1948 question”. Genuine, stable reconciliation has to be based on a recognition that Palestinians in the diaspora have a right to return to their homeland. From 1948 to this day, Israel has vehemently opposed any sort of return by Palestinian refugees. Even in unofficial peace initiatives proffered in recent years, the Israeli side refused to allow any real return and confined itself to offering compensation or resettlement in the Palestinian state or third countries.

What appears, on the face of it, to be an intractable issue, can be solved in the framework of an equal partnership between two independent states that recognize that members of both peoples belong in the whole land. According to the plan we are proposing, the State of Palestine will have the sovereign power to give Palestinian refugees citizenship. Once they receive Palestinian citizenship, they will be able to travel freely throughout the shared homeland, both in Israel and in Palestine, for work, tourism and residence.

Citizens of the Palestinian state, including former refugees, would be eligible for residency status in Israel and have all the rights conferred by such status, including the right to vote for local authorities.

To avoid inundation, as a first step, agreement would be reached on a significant number of Palestinian refugees who would be eligible for residency in the State of Israel.

The vision is that at the end of the process, any Palestinian, including former refugees, will be able to live anywhere in the shared homeland, within Israel
or within the Palestinian state. The phases leading up to the fulfillment of this vision will be implemented mutually and by consent.

Such a model would allow, on the one hand, Palestinians to return to the historical homeland from which they were exiled or expelled, and, on the other, enable Jewish Israelis to maintain the character of the State of Israel. Arrangements would be put in place for the restoration of refugee property lost or expropriated, or compensation for it, without creating new injustices.

The rebuilding of Palestinian communities destroyed after 1948 will be considered, as will remedies for Palestinians internally displaced within Israel. Israel and Palestine will work together to provide adequate compensation to Jews who felt forced to leave Arab countries or were expelled from them as a result of the Arab-Israeli conflict and had to leave their homes and other property behind.

This is not an easy solution, either emotionally or practically. It does, however, respect the interests and deep sentiments of both parties, and it ensures the question of the Palestinian refugees and the right of return is not swept under the rug, left to linger, like a ticking time bomb threatening the stability of any Israeli-Palestinian agreement.

Rectifying the injustice done to Palestinian refugees will also prove that Jewish nationality and sovereignty in the State of Israel does not have to come at the expense of the historical rights of the Palestinian people. Rectifying this injustice is also the key to equitable and stable neighborly relations between the two peoples.

### 3. INSTEAD OF SETTLEMENTS, ISRAELI RESIDENTS OF PALESTINE

About 600,000 Israelis now live as settlers in the territories occupied in the 1967 war. More than 400,000 of them in the West Bank / Judea and Samaria Area, and about
200,000 in East Jerusalem neighborhoods located in areas annexed to Israel immediately after the war. According to international law and UN resolutions, all of these settlements are illegal.

Still, their illegality cannot erase the fact that Jewish tradition sees the whole of Eretz Yisrael as the homeland, including the Judea and Samaria Area / West Bank. For this reason, true reconciliation and mutual recognition must include an option for Jews to live in every part of the shared homeland, in the State of Palestine and in the State of Israel. Prohibiting Jews from living in some parts of the shared homeland is incompatible with reconciliation. It is also important to remember that removing all or some settlements and settlers is a thorny political issue that has made it difficult to reach a solution involving two independent states - Israel and Palestine.

According to our proposed plan, the settlements will cease to exist as a political and legal construct that supports Jewish-Israeli supremacy and privilege in the shared space and will be converted into ordinary communities under full Palestinian sovereignty. However, Israeli citizens, including those now living in the Judea and Samaria Area / West Bank, will be able to freely and safely live in the independent Palestinian state, provided they accept the sovereignty of the State of Palestine and respect its laws. They will be eligible for residency status and have all the rights conferred by such status, including the right to vote for local authorities.

Like Palestinian citizens’ freedom to reside in Israel, Israelis’ freedom to reside in Palestine would be implemented gradually, and by consent, to avoid “inundating” the Palestinian state with Israeli citizens. The ultimate goal is a situation in which every Israeli is able to choose where to live, in the State of Israel or in the State of Palestine, as is every Palestinian citizen.

The current process of Israeli settlement expansion in the West Bank through the expropriation of land from Palestinian owners or the Palestinian public is extremely injurious to the Palestinian public, and, therefore, must end. It is worth noting here again that, in any event, under the “A Land for All” approach, the expansion of one settlement or another would not factor into the location of the permanent borders between Israel and Palestine.
There will be no Israeli military presence in the Palestinian state, but the two states will develop shared, effective and competent security services in addition to a commitment by each state to guarantee the safety of everyone in its territory, Jews and Palestinians. The communities where Israeli Jews live inside the Palestinian state will have self-governance on cultural, educational and religious matters.

Such an arrangement is not simple, but it also has great promise: mutual recognition that the space between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea is the shared homeland of the two peoples. Such recognition also includes Palestinian recognition that Jews are part of this homeland, and, therefore, have a right to live anywhere in it, whether within the State of Israel or the State of Palestine. Such recognition is a fundamental basis for true reconciliation between the two peoples. Palestinian willingness to contain a Jewish Israeli minority within its borders could, on its own, be a catalyst for reconciliation between the two nations.

More than any other place, Jerusalem embodies the full complexity of the conflict. Both sides see it as a fundamental part of their identity, both feel a profound historical, and religious connection to it, both demand sovereignty over it, and both want it as their capital.

The city of Jerusalem was divided during the war in 1948. Most Palestinians who lived on the side that remained in the State of Israel were forced to leave, as were most Jews who lived on the side that remained in the hands of the Kingdom of Jordan. Immediately after the 1967 War, Israel expanded the city by annexing areas seized in the war. The annexation remains unrecognized under international law. In the years since then, Israel built neighborhoods in these areas, where now more than 200,000 Israelis, most of them Jewish, live. Jerusalem poses a serious challenge to the notion of separation. The Clinton Plan allegedly resolved this issue by dividing Jerusalem’s current urban...
space along ethnic lines: “Jewish” neighborhoods for Israel, “Palestinian” neighborhoods for Palestine. In practice, however, dividing Jerusalem along these lines would produce neighborhoods surrounded by walls and fences, connected by tunnels, bridges or narrow fortified roads.

When it comes to the Old City and the holy places in and around it, the challenge becomes almost insurmountable, which is why even the strictest separation plans slate the Old City for joint management, with no separation, under international supervision, or at the very least, with deep international involvement.

Jerusalem is not a shared, equal city. Its Palestinian residents, nearly 40% of the total population, have no citizenship and suffer discrimination in almost every aspect of life. Despite this, separation in Jerusalem would come at a heavy human and financial cost. It would impede the city’s functioning and gravely harm its delicate social fabric. It would interfere with residents’ employment, access to holy places, tourism, commerce and the economy, environmental programs, medical services and more.

We are proposing to keep Jerusalem whole, open and shared rather than carved by walls and fences. Jerusalem will be the capital of both states, Israel and Palestine. It will have a special governing body to which both countries, Israel and Palestine, will delegate the powers it needs to function properly. Neither side will have domination or exclusivity over the city, and it will be run jointly to benefit all its residents, Jews and Arabs. Decisions on running the city will have to be agreed upon by both communities living in it, Arab and Jewish.

The two countries, Israel and Palestine, will decide how the special governing body in Jerusalem would run. It may be a single, shared municipal government elected by all residents, or two independent municipalities, one in the eastern part of the city and one in the west, operating under an umbrella municipality. The two countries will also decide what policing and judicial powers the special governing body in Jerusalem would have, and what the boundaries of this joint city would be - the current boundaries, the city as it was prior to 1967, the Jerusalem district of the British Mandate, or any other agreed area.
The Old City and the holy sites in and around it will be given special attention, based on the understanding that they must be freely accessible to members of all religions. They will be independently managed while observing mutual respect and cooperation.

Such a bi-national city structure is rare, but not unprecedented. The bilingual area of Brussels is run jointly by the Flemish and Walloons; the Brčko District, once a stumbling block in Bosnia and Herzegovina, is now a special regime run jointly by the three national communities that make up the country (Serb Bosnians, Muslim Bosniaks and Croat Bosnians).

These questions have to be faced starting right now. We are convinced, however, that the interests of both sides lead toward a free and open Jerusalem where the connection both sides feel to the city can be expressed and where everyone can live in equality and free of discrimination. This approach to the issue of Jerusalem could transform it from an impasse to a model for a shared life in the whole of Palestine/Eretz Yisrael.

5. SHARED PERIPHERAL SECURITY AND A FOCUS ON PERSONAL SAFETY

Any agreement must provide security in the broad sense of the term: both security for each of the states from external attacks by a foreign military or armed militias, as well as personal safety for all citizens against harm related to national, ethnic or religious background. This is a fundamental condition. Both sides, Jews and Palestinians, need this security.

Many, especially on the Israeli side, believe that full separation will ensure security. According to this theory, without friction between Israelis and Palestinians, there will be no violence. The prevalent sentiment on both sides, but particularly the Israeli side, is that the other side cannot be trusted. Proponents of this approach in Israel sometimes tend to support various unilateral solutions as part of which Israel, the stronger side in the conflict,
decides what its borders are and takes care of its own security without relying on the Palestinian side.

But, any arrangement that seeks to provide sustainable security must be based on mutual trust and arrangements. This was true for the peace treaty between Israel and Egypt, as well as the one between Israel and Jordan, and it should certainly be the same for whatever security arrangement is made between Israel and Palestine, which have no natural geographic divide and whose populations and histories are intertwined.

Moreover: security, in the broad sense of the term, cannot be based solely on the current balance of powers, which obviously favors the stronger party, but may change in the future. Security, in its profound sense, must dampen the motivation to harm the other party by creating a shared interest in the prosperity of the shared homeland and the security of all its residents.

This is why we are proposing a platform that combines full security responsibility by each country in its sovereign territory with security partnership between the two countries. Under this plan, Palestine and Israel will have independent security forces. Only Palestinian forces will operate in Palestinian territory, only Israeli forces will operate in Israel. However, the two countries will cooperate closely on matters of security, intelligence and policing.

Having free movement between Israel and Palestine does not preclude either country from denying entry to hostile individuals or having border checks where necessary. The borders will be open, not lawless.

Security cooperation will also apply to guarding the outer borders separating Israel/Palestine and the countries surrounding them. If the two countries agree, joint Israeli-Palestinian forces will be deployed to the perimeter of the two countries, alongside international forces.

The two countries will sign a mutual defense treaty that will forbid any foreign military from entering either of their territories without the consent of the other country. They will also sign demilitarization agreements to express the
commitment of both sides to refraining from hostile activities. Finally, they will also sign extradition agreements to guarantee neither country becomes a “sanctuary state” for individuals who commit crimes in the other country.

Only strong cooperation between two independent states, Israel and Palestine, can provide true security for citizens of both countries wherever they choose to travel or live. Security partnership is better than unilateral moves, as we have all learned from the unilateral withdrawal from Gaza. Partnership is the key to trust, and trust is the key to stability and security.

6. PALESTINIAN CITIZENS OF ISRAEL: TRUE PARTNERSHIP AND EQUALITY

When the 1948 War ended and the armistice was signed in 1949, about 160,000 Palestinians remained in Israel and became citizens. About 750,000 Palestinians who had lived in the area where Israel was established were expelled, forced to flee or fled. Most of the lands belonging to those who remained were expropriated, and tens of thousands of Palestinians were internally displaced. Palestinian citizens of Israel lived under a military government until 1966.

Today, the Palestinian population of Israel is about 1.5 million, accounting for some 17% of the country’s overall population (not including residents of East Jerusalem). This is a sizeable national minority by any measure. While over the years, the status of Arab citizens of Israel has changed, it has always remained inferior and marginal.

The Oslo process largely overlooked Palestinians living in Israel. To add to that, many in Israel’s Jewish “peace camp” insisted on keeping Israel “Jewish and democratic” as the main, if not sole, argument in support of negotiating for peace and ending the occupation. In the name of maintaining a “Jewish majority,” proposals have been made to “divorce” the Palestinians, and even “transfer” Palestinian communities to the Palestinian state that would be
established as part of a peace agreement. Today, the term “Jewish state,” when used to describe the state of Israel, expresses Jewish supremacy, even exclusivity, in all state institutions - education, culture, land management, security and more. The Nation State Law is an attempt to cement this supremacy.

The Palestinians living in Israel are part of the Palestinian people, and any attempt to ignore this is no more than an illusion that stands in the way of reaching true peace. By turning the relationship between Israel and Palestine into a partnership between the two countries and two peoples living in this land, the A Land for All platform will ease the tension between the two nations and could enhance democratic, civilian space as it relates to the rights of the Palestinian minority inside Israel as well.

Reducing the tension between the two nations and accepting their complex identities would also help the Palestinian minority in Israel develop its civil identity within Israel and attain equal status in the country. The outline proposed here paves the way to a redistribution of power and resources within the State of Israel, based on agreement, partnership and equality between the Jewish majority and the Palestinian minority.

Aside from the substantive transformation the overall arrangement presents, action must be taken to amend existing discriminatory laws and practices that prevent equal participation by Palestinian citizens of Israel as equal citizens in their country. These amendments include equal representation, the revocation of discriminatory laws and systems, equitable allocation of resources, equitable access to land, planning and development, the legal resolution of construction including legal recognition for Bedouin communities in the Negev. Palestinian minority in Israel should have self-governance in various fields, and Arabic should be restored as an official language. Partnership should be a feature of both the relationship between the two countries and the relationship between the two national groups within each of them.

The Palestinian minority in Israel already lives in close quarters with the Jewish majority. Its political, economic and civilian ascent in recent years has created a platform for new partnerships with the Jewish public on a more
equal footing. An arrangement based on partnership and mutual respect between the two nations throughout the geographic space can turn this closeness and the experience gained by the Palestinian public inside Israel into a catalyst for reconciliation.

7. GAZA IS NOT AN ISLAND

Gaza seemingly should not require a separate section. It is part of since the British mandate Palestine, as well as every agreement signed between Israel and the PLO. The international community also views it as part of Palestine. Any agreement signed by Palestinians and Israelis should apply to the Gaza Strip.

However, the unique conditions in the Gaza Strip do require special attention. As is known, in 2005, Israel unilaterally withdrew its military from the Gaza Strip and dismantled the settlements it had built there. Two years later, Hamas set up a government in Gaza that does not accept the authority of the Palestinian government in Ramallah. These two developments created a sense that Gaza is a “special case,” a separate entity.

But Gaza’s case can serve as a lesson on how wrong and ineffective separation is in the Israeli-Palestinian context. Instead of subduing tension, Israel’s unilateral withdrawal from Gaza only amplified it, and the Gaza-Israel “border” has become the worst flashpoint in the conflict.

The Great March of Return protests reminded everyone that about 70% of Gaza’s residents are refugees and their descendants and that they have not forgotten the towns and villages from which they were exiled seventy years earlier. Gaza has been and will remain part of the Palestinian story. There is no solution for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict without a solution for Gaza, and there is no solution for Gaza without a solution for the conflict as a whole.

According to the plan proposed by A Land for All, the Gaza Strip will be part of the Palestinian state, and therefore, part of the partnership between Israel
and Palestine. The border between the Gaza Strip and Israel will be open, and Palestinian citizens living in Gaza will be able to enter Israel. In these conditions, there would be no difficulty building roads to connect between the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

However, if Gaza is to be included in the agreement, it cannot have a government that is separate from the central Palestinian government, and no independent military force or militia that is not subordinate to the central Palestinian government can operate there. The agreement will preclude any armed militias - either Palestinian or Israeli.

Like other elements of the conflict that appear to be intractable, the solution for Gaza will also come from partnership. It may seem out of reach, but those who remember life before the first intifada, know that there was a time when tens of thousands of Gaza residents worked inside Israel. We can go back to those days, only this time, in partnership and equality without occupation and oppression.
The concept of partnership between two independent states, Israel and Palestine, and between two peoples, lies at the core of the paradigm shift we are proposing. Instead of a relationship that largely relies on use of force and violence, as is the case today, we propose a partnership between two equal sides.

However, cooperation between two states and two peoples cannot take place in a void. It needs a structure, rules and institutions to govern it. Shared institutions provide the structure in which differences between the two parties can be worked out through debate and discussion and settled through mutual decision making rather than violence.

The notion of partnership between nations has repeatedly proved to be a guarantee for peace and stability. The European Union is built on partnership between independent countries that fought each other in two world wars. For all its weaknesses, it has still given Europe the longest peace it has ever known. The Good Friday agreement in Northern Ireland is built on power sharing and parity of esteem between two communities that were locked in conflict for years and ended the violence. The peace agreement in Bosnia ended a bloody civil war by creating an intricate system of partnerships between the ethnic groups in the country - Bosniaks, Serbs and Croats - which persists despite tensions between these groups.

We are unable, at this moment, to provide a detailed description of what this shared superstructure would look like exactly, precisely what powers it would have and how its mechanisms would function. These details still require much work. But what we do know now is that to guarantee that the partnership between the two countries and nations is built on mutual respect, fairness and equality, this structure must be substantive and must have real powers. According to the A Land for All platform, the two countries will have to guarantee an array of basic rights for all citizens anywhere they are in either
Israel or Palestine and ensure the status of the national minority in each country. An inter-state court will guarantee both countries respect these rights. A system of close collaboration and shared institutions dealing with security, intelligence and policing will guarantee the personal and collective safety of citizens in both countries, including defending the countries’ external borders.

Shared institutions will also be set up to handle socio-economic rights, labor and welfare, economic development, customs and financial institutions, education, tourism, traffic and sea and air travel, environmental protection, natural resource exploitation and any other area the countries determine would be better served if managed jointly. The exact nature and scope of these institutions will be improved and developed, but one principle must be adhered to steadfastly: These institutions will be built on equality, partnership and mutual respect with a view to serving the interests of both parties. We are aware that to many, the concept we are proposing - a peace based on partnership between Palestine and Israel - sounds detached from reality and impossible. Our retort is twofold: First, reality in other places shows a partnership like this can be built, even in places with a history of deeply entrenched conflict.

Second, unlike the “classic” two state solution, which is rooted in separation, our platform has four significant advantages. It is more realistic, in that it is not based on forced displacement or denial of rights; it is more ethical as it is based on the principles of justice, partnership and equality; it better serves the parties’ deep interests, primarily the sense of belonging many feel towards the entire land; and it calls on us - all those who want to live here in dignity, peace and pride and believe it can be done - to work towards expanding the common good.
The road to a peace based on partnership between the two peoples and the two countries is long. After more than a hundred years of conflict, and particularly after the last twenty years, with repeated failed peace talks and cyclical violence, trust between the two peoples is at an all-time low. The A Land for All platform is based on a high level of trust between the parties. The lessons of the near and distant past do teach us, however, that trust can be built and mistrust is not predestined. Trust or mistrust between nations is not a question of the nations’ characters but of the political arrangements between them.

The very fact that an Israeli-Palestinian movement like A Land for All is being formed, bringing together Palestinians and Israelis under a shared vision for resolving the conflict, is an important step in building this trust. In the years that we have worked together, it has been shown that Israelis and Palestinians, despite coming from different backgrounds and political approaches, can work together.

What we have been doing this far - hundreds of meetings between Israelis and Palestinians, meetings with politicians, public leaders, religious figures and diplomats - separate and joint events, conferences, think tanks, working papers, articles and media interviews in Hebrew, Arabic and foreign languages - all of this should now be scaled up. Our goal is to build an Israeli-Palestinian political force that can push both peoples towards partnership.

We have already succeeded in injecting the concept of Palestinian-Israeli partnership into the political lexicon. We have managed to recruit supporters with different world views in both Israeli and Palestinian societies, inside the political establishment an outside it. We are working to expand these circles and include as many groups and perspectives as possible. We are convinced that existing political powers, Israeli and Palestinian, can be mobilized under this vision.
Alongside this political work, other paths should be forged to increase trust between the two peoples. These could include direct joint action for equality and against discrimination and denial of rights, local initiatives on environmental, cultural and other issues, joint action to reduce economic disparities between the two societies and more.

Education could have a decisive impact on advancing mutual familiarity and creating a basis of trust between the two peoples. One of the goals of A Land for All is to create a new language that will allow each side to maintain its identity, while at the same time, becoming familiar with the other side’s aspirations and history, and internalizing them.

Presenting a political vision of two independent states in a shared homeland complements existing actions and initiatives working towards change. It is meant to encourage and support more of these initiatives in the future. Aside from the importance of each of these initiatives on its own, they are important steps on the road towards building a broad political peace movement that sees partnership, two independent states in a shared structure, and the end of the occupation as the right vision for Israeli-Palestinian peace.

A Land for All is not fantasy. It is rooted in the historical, geographic and emotional realities of the conflict, and it is based on historic precedent. Nor is it a close-ended solution. On the contrary, it invites discussion, comments, corrections and additions. But to work towards it, we also have to be able to dream, and mostly, make dreams a reality. It’s in our hands.